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The Implications of VaR and Short-Selling Restrictions on the
Portfolio Manager Performance
ABSTRACT
The ability of a portfolio manager to deliver higher returns with relatively low risk is a fundamental issue in
finance. We analyze here the performance of a portfolio manager under two diﬀerent types of constraints.
For a manager with private information, we compare the eﬀect of value at risk (VaR) and short-selling
constraints on the relation between the expected portfolio return and the market return. We find that in
more volatile market, the VaR restriction will have a stronger eﬀect on the manager performance compared
to the short-selling restriction eﬀect. The VaR constraint also strongly aﬀects a manager with good quality
of information while the short-selling restriction moderately aﬀects manager with any level of information
quality. For the manager attitude toward the risk, a too aggressive manager will find his overall performance
more aﬀected by the VaR constraint. Therefore, financial institutions such as large investment banks and
hedge-funds with a strong ability to obtain superior information could be more aﬀected by a very strong
VaR restriction than by a short-selling restriction.
JEL classification: G11, G28, G32
Keywords: Performance valuation, Asymmetric information, Financial regulation, VaR restriction,
Short-Selling restriction.
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1 Introduction
Many economists have argued that the absence of strong regulation of investments banks as well
as hedge-funds in US is a key element behind the spread of the subprime crisis from the stock
market to almost all financial institutions (see, e.g., Davies and Green, 2008). It is then likely that
sooner or later almost all financial institutions will be subject to some type of regulations in order
to reduce the systemic problem in the market. Among others, two type of regulation which are
likely to be strengthened are the short-selling constraint and the Value at Risk constraint.
In one hand, the short-selling (SS) regulation has been adopted by US regulators during the
subprime crisis and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has adopted
a similar measure in a final regulation paper (see IOSCO, 2009). In another hand, the value at risk
(VaR) has been widely adopted as a regulation which can mitigate the eﬀect of exposure to extreme
risk by the financial community.1 The Basel II Accord regulatory framework sets the amount of
capital that banks should hold in function of the VaR that they have reported. In order to reduce
the level of capital, central managements usually set a level of VaR to diﬀerent portfolio managers.
These two regulatory constraints may have diﬀerent type of eﬀects on portfolio manager in diﬀerent
market conditions.
Gendron and Genest (1990) analyze the eﬀect of short-selling constraint on the relation between
expected portfolio return and the market return. But while a fair amount of work has already been
done on the link between the VaR regulation and financial sector stability see (e.g., Basak and
Shapiro (2001), and Alexander and Batista (2005) which show that VaR is not eﬀective at reducing
risk and Yiu (2004), and Cuoco, He and Isaenko (2008) who used diﬀerents methodology and showed
that VaR can limit risk taking behavior), the impact of the VaR regulation on the performance of
portfolio manager remains a challenging question which should be addressed. This paper has then
two main objectives. The first is to address this issue and the second is to make a comparative
analysis of these two regulatory constraints in respect to the performance of a portfolio manager
with private information.
In this paper we analyze the eﬀect of the VaR constraint on the relation between expected
portfolio excess-return and the market excess-return and we make a comparative analysis with the
relation obtained with the SS constraint. Following Gendron and Genest (1990), we adopt the
mean-variance setup enriched with the manager private information model. We then add a VaR
constraint. In this model, the portfolio manager has the objective to maximize the mean-variance
of the excess-return of his portfolio under the condition that he meets the regulation constraint
fixed by the regulator or the central management of the corporation. We assume that the central
management sets this regulatory constraint in the form of a maximum loss that the portfolio
manager should not exceed with a certain confidence level. In this model the portfolio manager
has access to a private signal which gives him an indication on the future excess-return of the
market. The information of the manager is characterized by his prediction of market excess-return
which is assumed to be normally distributed around the actual market excess-return. Therefore,
1For an historical background of the adoption of VaR as the widely used measure of risk in financial risk manage-
ment see Jorion (2000), and for an overview of the concept and calculating models, see Duﬃe and Pan (1997).
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the quality of this information is given by the level of the standard deviation of this distribution.
Small standard deviation means high information quality.
Gendron and Genest (1990) show that in the context of informed portfolio manager, unlike the
quadratic relation obtained when no constraint exists, the short sell investment constraint leads
to a type of relation conjectured by Treynor and Mazuy (1966). This relation is smooth and flat
for lower market return and becomes increasing with stronger curvature while the market return
becomes positive and large. Their result suggests that the portfolio manager is strongly aﬀected
by the short-selling constraint during the market downturn and typically gets a negative expected
return in this situation.2
We obtain with VaR constraint a less asymmetric curvature than the one obtained with the
short-selling constraint. When the average excess-return is null, the conditional expected portfolio
excess-return is a symmetric function of the market excess return. It follows that the conditional
expected portfolio excess-return of a manager under even a strong VaR restriction can be symmetric
as in the case of unrestricted manager. This contrast with the asymmetric curvature of the con-
ditional expected excess-return in the short-selling constraint. Besides, unlike in the short-selling
regulated market, a VaR restriction allows the manager to enjoy positive expected conditional
excess-return even during downturn market conditions since it allows the manager to short sell the
market portfolio, while the short selling restriction does not. Moreover, as expected, the quality
of private information improves the manager performance in any setup. The overall performance
valuation instead shows that a strong VaR regulation is more detrimental to manager with better
quality of information than short-selling regulation. Furthermore we find that in more volatile mar-
ket, the conditional expected excess-return of a VaR manager is lower in extreme negative market
situation, than in a less volatile market. This result is confirmed when using the overall portfolio
valuation which shows that market volatility hampers strongly the manager performance under
VaR. This shows implicitly that VaR may be eﬀective at reducing risk taking behavior, a result
close to the one of Yiu (2004).
Finally, under VaR regulation, an aggressive manager performs better than risk-averse manager.
But compared with a manager under short-selling restriction, a very aggressive manager will find
a strong VaR regulation more harmful. It follows that using the manager performance as the
main criterion, institutions such as large investment banks and hedge-funds which are viewed as
highly informed and very aggressive are better under a short-selling regulation than under a VaR
regulation. Actually, the VaR restriction disallows highly leveraged long positions in the market
portfolio, but the short selling restriction allows such positions. Since in normal times, the average
excess return on the market is positive, highly leveraged long positions are beneficial.
The next section presents the portfolio manager optimization problem, and provides the analyt-
ical optimal decision of the portfolio manager followed by the expressions of the portfolio expected
excess-return and performance valuation. The section 3 uses calibration exercises to analyze the
similitudes and diﬀerences in the implications of VaR and short-selling constraints, and then to
investigate the eﬀect of the market volatility, the information quality as well as the risk aversion
2The short-selling constraint is often used for regulation purpose specially against speculation, while the VaR
constraint is more common in practice for risk management and capital requirement.
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on expected excess-return and performance valuation with and without restrictions. The section 4
concludes.
2 The Portfolio Manager Problem
Before introducing the problem of the portfolio manager in aVaR restricted setup, we present here
conceptual distinction between the VaR and the short-selling constraints.
2.1 The Nature of the VaR and the Short-selling Constraints
It is important to stress the fact that although the VaR and the short-selling constraints are
both used by regulators to prevent the market from systemic problems, there is a clear diﬀerence
between their initial purpose. The VaR restriction is a risk constraint specially designed to control
the level of the overall risk regardless the type of position taken by the manager, while the short-
selling constraint is a trading restriction used to prevent negative speculation against some stocks,
specially when the market is in a down move.3 Gendron and Genest (1990) solve the problem of
the portfolio manager under the latter constraint. Below we introduce and solve the problem of a
portfolio manager with private information and under a VaR restriction.
2.2 Portfolio Manager Problem under VaR Restriction
We consider a portfolio manager who accesses to a private information on the future market excess-
return and who has a mean-variance objective function. Following Gendron and Genest (1990) we
assume that the market-excess (from risk free rate) return Rm is normally distributed with mean
μ and variance σ2u.
Rm ∼ N
¡
μ, σ2u
¢
(1)
The portfolio manager possesses a private information characterized by a signal (S) that provides
some level of information about the future market excess-return. Conditional to the realization of
the market excess-return this signal follows a normal distribution around the actual value of market
excess-return, rm and with variance, σ2s.
S |Rm=rm ∼ N
¡
rm, σ2s
¢
(2)
The variance inverse
¡
1/σ2s
¢
indicates the quality in terms of accuracy of manager private
information. Smaller variance means a more accurate information. As stated in Gendron and
Genest (1990), by the Bayes’ theorem, we can easily obtain
Rm |S = s ∼ N
¡
ms, σ2
¢
(3)
3 In February 2010, the US Securities and Exchange Commission approved some short-selling restrictions during
periods of stress and volatility.
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where ms = σ2
¡
μ/σ2u + s/σ2s
¢
and σ2 =
¡
1/σ2u + 1/σ2s
¢−1. So, with his private information, the
manager observes a distribution of the market excess-return with less volatility (more accuracy).4
The portfolio excess-return is
Rp = θRm (4)
where θ is the share invested in the market portfolio.5
The portfolio manager problem’s is to maximize his utility subject to the VaR constraint set by
the top management of the corporation or by the regulator. The investor Mean-Variance problem
is therefore6,
Max
θ
©
E (Rp |S = s)− ρ2V ar (Rp |S = s)
ª
s.t. V aR (Rp) ≤ V
(5)
where ρ is the manager risk aversion coeﬃcient and V is the maximum value of the VaR set by the
top management.7 This problem can be easily expressed in the explicit form as follows
Max
θ
©
θms − ρ2θ
2σ2
ª
s.t. θμ+Φ−1 (α) |θ|σu ≥ −V
(6)
where α is the level of the VaR (the probability to violate the VaR limit), and Φ the cdf of the
standard normal distribution.
The main diﬀerence with the traditional mean-variance problem is the information asymmetry,
and the diﬀerence with the short-selling restriction solved by Gendron and Genest (1990) is the
non-linearity in the constraint. The VaR restriction leads to a more complex solution.8
4For a better understanding of this signaling model, let us consider three simple cases: i) The case
?
σ2s →∞
?
,
which corresponds to a manager with no private information. Therefore, his distribution of the market return is as
public information (Rm |S = s ∼ N
?
μ, σ2u
?
, although this case is interesting we will focus in the paper on he cases
with private information); ii) When both public and private "information" have the same distribution. Therefore, the
distribution of informed manager is Rm |S = s ∼ N
?
μ,
σ2u
2
?
, what means that the variance of the return distribution
observed by the manager is cut by half; iii) The case where both "information" have the same variance but diﬀerent
means. The return distribution of informed manager is Rm |S = s ∼ N
?
μ+ s
2
,
σ2u
2
?
. What means that the private
signal will not only reduce the uncertainty of informed manager, but also change his expectation of future return
compared to uninformed manager.
5This expression of the manager portfolio return is consistent with the theorem of two portfolios stating that in
the equilibrium, each agent ends up with a portfolio including a risk-free asset and a fraction of the market portfolio.
6Beyond the fact that the mean-variance utility function is a commonly used model with basis finance intuition
of trade-oﬀ between risk and return, the use of this function here is essential to derive an analytical solution for the
problem and subsequent performance measures.
7 It is important here to notice that the distribution used in the VaR is not conditional on the manager private
information since the assessment of the respect for the VaR limit is done at a diﬀerent level where the private
information may not be available.
8Alexander and Baptista (2004) in a traditional mean-variance model analyze and compare the eﬀect of VaR and
CVaR constraints on the portfolio selection, while Alexander et al. (2007) examine a similar problem with discrete
distributions. The mean diﬀerence with the present framework is the private information.
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Proposition 1 The solution to the optimization problem in (6) is given by
bθ = ms
ρσ2
[1A1 + 1A2 ]−
V
μ+Φ−1 (α)σu
1A3 −
V
μ− Φ−1 (α)σu
1A4 (7)
where
A1 =
©
msμ+Φ−1 (α)msσu + ρσ2V ≥ 0,ms ≥ 0
ª
A2 =
©
msμ− Φ−1 (α)msσu + ρσ2V ≥ 0,ms ≤ 0
ª
A3 =
©
msμ+Φ−1 (α)msσu + ρσ2V ≤ 0,ms ≥ 0
ª
A4 =
©
msμ− Φ−1 (α)msσu + ρσ2V ≤ 0,ms ≤ 0
ª
and 1Ai is the indicator function taking the value 1 if condition Ai is true and 0 otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix
This solution includes three parts. The first component (ms
±
ρσ2 ) is the optimal portfolio when
no constraint is imposed. The second and the third parts come from the VaR constraints. This
solution will lead to the unrestricted case if we set the VaR level extremely large such that it has no
eﬀect. Or alternatively in practice, it may happen just if the market risk level is very low compared
to the capital requirement level. Using the above solution, we can now derive the manager portfolio
expected return and its overall valuation.
2.3 Expected Portfolio Excess-Return
To analyze the performance of the manager in diﬀerent market conditions, we provide below the
expected value of portfolio excess-return conditional to actual market excess-return.
Proposition 2 Given the market excess-return (Rm = rm), assuming that Φ−1(α) ≤ 0, and under
the VaR constraint in problem (6), the manager portfolio expected excess-return is
E(Rp|Rm=rm) = rm
⎛
⎝
⎡
⎣B2Φ (B3)− B1ρσs [1−Φ(B3)] +
1
ρσs
∞Z
B3
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎦ 1{μ≥−Φ−1(α)σu}
+
h
B2Φ (B3) +B4 (1−Φ(B5))− B1ρσs [Φ(B5)− Φ(B3)]
+ 1ρσs
B5Z
B3
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎦ 1{Φ−1(α)σu≤μ≤−Φ−1(α)σu}
+
⎡
⎣B4 (1− Φ(B5))− B1Φ(B5)ρσs +
1
ρσs
B5Z
−∞
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎦ 1{μ≤Φ−1(α)σu}
⎞
⎠
where, B1 = −σs
µ
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¶
, B2 =
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
, (8)
B3 = B1 + ρσsB2, B4 =
−V
(μ+Φ−1(α)σu)
,
B5 = B1 + ρσsB4; and φ is the pdf of the standard normal distribution.
Proof: See Appendix
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This result is more complex than the result in the case where the manager is not restricted
in his investment. In this latter case, the relation between market excess-return and the expected
excess-return for the manager portfolio is quadratic as follows
E(Rp|Rm=rm) =
µ
μ
ρσ2u
¶
rm +
µ
1
ρσ2s
¶
r2m (9)
In order to compare the result with the short-selling constraint, we recall below the result
provided by Gendron and Genest (1990). They show that in the situation where the share θ
invested in the market portfolio is between a lower bound k1 and an upper bound k2, the expected
excess-return for the manager portfolio is given by9
E(Rp|Rm=rm) = rm (1− Φ (ku)) +
¡
arm + br2m
¢ kuZ
kl
φ (z) dz + bσsrm
kuZ
kl
zφ (z) dz (10)
where kl = (k1 − a− brm) /bσs , ku = (k2 − a− brm) /bσs , a =
μ
ρσ2u
and b =
1
ρσ2s
We can notice from proposition 1, that when V → +∞, the expected excess return of a manager
optimizing his portfolio allocation under the V aR constraint, should converge to the solution of
the unconstrained situation. Also when kl → +∞ (i.e. k1 → +∞) and ku → −∞ (i.e. k2 → −∞),
the expected excess-return of a manager optimizing his portfolio allocation under the short-selling
constraint should converge to the unconstrained solution.10
Proposition 3 Under the VaR constraint, if the average market excess return is zero (μ = 0),
the relation between the optimal portfolio expected excess-return and the market excess-return is
symmetric.
Proof: See Appendix
We will see with numerical examples in the next section that if μ 6= 0, this symmetric relationship
is not necessary true. The importance of this result resides in the comparison of the relation in
other setup. So when the average market excess return is zero the VaR constraint produce a similar
shape as the one obtained in the constraint-free framework. The only eﬀect of the VaR constraint
is just to flatten the curve and reduce the portfolio excess return in both directions of the market.
However, when the market excess return becomes positive there is an asymmetric relation between
portfolio and market returns.
9Using k1 and k2 , provides a more general specification of the constraint. In our calibration exercise, we will focus
on the short-selling restriction which corresponds to k1 = 0. We can also notice that for a borrowing restriction we
can set k2 = 1. But instead we will use an arbitrary large value of k2 (=100) as unlike Gendron and Genest (1990),
we do not impose a borrowing constraint.
10Compared to Gendron and Genest (1990), it worth noticing that both optimization problems are diﬀerent since
Gendron and Genest (1990) put the restriction directly on the weight invested in the market, while here our restriction
is put on a combination of first and second moments of portfolio excess-return. This explains why our solution is
more complex and as we will see in the calibrations, both results are very diﬀerent.
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2.4 Performance Valuation
As stated by Brennan (1979), one convenient way of summarizing the curvature of a manager’s
payoﬀ function is to regard the latter as a contingent claim, assume continuous trading, and compute
its value using a risk-neutral valuation relationship. Gendron and Genest (1990) provide the below
formulation for the performance valuation
V L = (1 + rf )−1
∞Z
−∞
E(Rp|rm)dF (rm), F (rm) ∼ N(0, σ2u), (11)
where rf is the risk-free rate.
This measure of performance accounts for both return and risk and can be related to the Jensen
alpha.
2.4.1 Jensen Alpha and Performance Valuation
As defined above the use of a risk neutral relationship implies that the performance valuation is a
risk-adjusted measure of expected return. To get a better view of this intuition, let take the Jensen
alpha, α defined in the CAPM by
Rp = α+ βRm
Under the risk neutral distribution F ,
∞Z
−∞
E(Rm|rm)dF (rm) =
∞Z
−∞
rmdF (rm) = 0. Therefore
V L = (1 + rf )−1α. So the performance valuation is exactly the discounted value of Jensen alpha
under the market model assumption.
2.4.2 Performance Valuation under diﬀerent Setups
We provide below the analytical expression of the performance valuation under diﬀerent frameworks.
Case of no constraint: In absence of any constraint, we can easily see as it is the case in
Gendron and Genest (1990) that, the portfolio manager performance valuation is
V L = (1 + rf )−1
£
σ2u/ρσ
2
s
¤
. (12)
Equation (12) shows that the risk aversion is negatively related to the valuation when there
is no restriction. When the manager is too risk averse he reduces its portfolio valuation. Besides
as expected, the quality of manager information improves its valuation. In fact the quality of
information is extremely good when σ2s → 0, and since V L is a decreasing function of σ2s, we have
this expected result.
Under VaR constraint: Let us recall that it follows from the above proposition 2 that
E(Rp|Rm=rm) has diﬀerent expressions depending on the interval where μ belongs to. The most
realistic range for μ is
£
Φ−1(α)σu,−Φ−1(α)σu
¤
.11 We therefore focus on this case.
11As the expected return can be positive or negative, the only range that can satisfy with this requirement is the
one we use here for performance valuation
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Proposition 4 The performance valuation under the VaR constraint and when
Φ−1(α)σu ≤ μ ≤ −Φ−1(α)σu
is given by
V LV aR =
(1−C)
(1+rf )
⎡
⎣σs
⎛
⎝B2
b2Z
−∞
yφA2(y)dy +B4
∞Z
b4
yφA2(y)dy +
μ
ρσ2u
b4Z
b2
yφA2(y)dy
⎞
⎠
+1ρ
b4Z
b2
y2φA2(y)dy
⎤
⎦
.
where, bi = −σs
³
μ
σ2u
´
+ ρσsBi; C =
σ2s
σ2u + σ2s
; A =
p
1/C, B2 and B4 defined as in (8)
Proof: See Appendix
It is straightforward that when V → +∞, V LV aR → V L, the valuation in the unrestricted
framework
Under short-selling constraint: As derived by Gendron and Genest (1990), the performance
valuation of the portfolio manager when facing this trading restriction is given by,
V LSS = (1 + rf )−1 [V1 + V2 + V3] (13)
where
V1 = kl
σ2u
σ2u + σ2s
cZ
−∞
ydF (y);V2 = ku
σ2u
σ2u + σ2s
∞Z
d
ydF (y);
V3 =
aσ2u
σ2u + σ2s
dZ
c
ydF (y) +
bσ2u
σ2u + σ2s
dZ
c
y2dF (y);
c =
kl − a
b
, d =
ku − a
b
, and F (y) ∼ N(0, σ2u + σ2s).
Then it follows that when kl → −∞; and ku → +∞; V LSS has almost the same value as V L.
They argue that for well informed manager the short-selling constraint reduces considerably its
valuation.
3 Analysis of the Model Implications
We use calibration method to analyze the results.12 In order to do that we use realistic values of
the parameters derived from actual data or commonly used in the literature. Although implied
results depends of parameter values, this exercise provides intuition for a more realistic framework.
12The complexity of the above formula does not allow for a complete analytical analysis. And furthermore, such
complete analysis including unrealistic parameters’ values may not provide consistent conclusions.
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3.1 Calibration
We carry our calibration with the objective of matching the US stock market dynamics over the
recent decades. To compute the average excess-return we subtract the nominal long-term annual
return of the US long-term treasury bond which is 7.5% over the period 1965-2005 to the nominal
long-term market annual return of the S&P500 which is estimated at about 11.5% over the same
period.13 Therefore the average excess-return used for calibration is μ = 0.04.We use the real long-
term annual rate on US bond as the proxy of the risk-free return rf and we obtain approximately
3%.
We use as benchmark for the risk aversion coeﬃcient ρ = 5.14 The confidence level of the
market VaR that we use is 99% which is the level used by many major banks in US and also
imposed by the 1996 Basel Accord. It follows that the benchmark α is 1%. We use the S&P500
long-term annual standard deviation (15%) as the proxy of market volatility σu. For the parameter
σs characterizing the quality of the information the benchmark is taken as 10% which is between
the value used by Gendron and Genest (1990) and the market volatility. The value of the VaR is
also an important element in our calibration. V is the maximum percentage loss of the portfolio
that should not be exceeded with probability 1 − α, in other words, for a V = 0.1, the manager
is certain with a probability 1− α to lose less that 10% of the value of his portfolio. To calibrate
V , we use the estimate of the VaR reported for six big US banks in Berkowitz and O’Brien (2003).
This leads to an approximated V = 0.518.15
3.2 Analyzing Manager Portfolio Performances under Diﬀerent Restrictions
We perform the analysis on two diﬀerent dimensions: (i) the relation between the manager portfolio
expected return and the market return, and (ii) the overall valuation which integrates over all
possible values of the market return to provide a single value of risk-adjusted performance. Using
above values of parameters, we derive numerical value of expected portfolio return and overall
valuation. Therefore we graph corresponding relation to have a better understanding of constraints’
implications.
3.2.1 Characterization of the Performance of a VaR Restricted Manager: The Form
of the Curvature
The form of the relation between the portfolio return and the market return is central here to
analyze the manager performance. We start by comparing the general curvature form of this
relation in the context of VaR constraint with the form of curvature obtained by Gendron and
13We also tried diﬀerent time periods and find results very stable. The final choice on the 1965-2005 time period
was guided by the availability of all these time-series at the time we performed the calibration.
14This is a reasonable value considering the range of values usually used in the financial literature.
15Actually, the average of the VaRs Berkowitz and O’Brien (2003) report is 3.43. As our estimated volatility is
0.15, and since their VaR is standardized, to get our VaR limit value, we multiply both numbers. We can notice that
although the report daily standardized VaR, by using annual volatility, we obtain an annualized VaR.
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Genest (1990) in the case of short-selling constraint.16
[INSERT Figure 1 HERE]
Two main observations can be derived from Figure 1. First, unlike the short-selling constraint,
the VaR constraint expected portfolio excess-return has a curvature close to a quadratic form.
Furthermore, with VaR constraint the manager can get positive portfolio excess-return when market
excess-return is negative, what is not possible under the short-selling constraint. Actually, due
to the fact that with the short-selling restriction, the portfolio manager will always hold a non-
negative share of market portfolio, he is constrained to obtain a negative excess-return when market
return is negative. This result in the VaR restricted framework is more in line with Pfleiderer and
Bhattacharya (1983) or Admati and Ross (1985) information models rather than Treynor and
Mazuy (1966) conjectured curvature reproduced by Gendron and Genest (1990) in the short-selling
restricted framework. Second, in an upturn market situation specially with high returns, under
the short-selling constraint the manager performance is comparable to a situation without any
constraint, while the VaR constrained manager is significantly outperformed by the unconstrained
manager.
3.2.2 The Eﬀect of VaR Restriction on Performance
Under a VaR restriction, there is obviously a positive relation between V and the conditional
portfolio excess-return (see Figure 2) as well as the overall portfolio valuation. The overall perfor-
mance valuation of a manager under VaR restriction is lower than the one of a manager under the
short-selling restriction, for a strong restriction (V lower than 0.75), and larger when V is above.
[INSERT Figure 2 HERE]
We can notice from Figure 2 that, for our benchmark value of the VaR threshold (0.518),
the valuation of the overall performance will be more aﬀected under VaR restriction than under
short-selling restriction.
3.2.3 Market Volatility and Performance
When the market is less volatile, i.e. when σu is smaller, the conditional expected portfolio return
of the manager under VaR restriction is higher for positive market excess-returns as well as for
extreme negative excess-returns (see Figure 3). This results on extreme negative returns is due to
the asymmetry induced by the fact that the average market excess-return is positive (μ = 4%).
This result rests on the following rationale. The average excess-return is slightly positive, therefore
when the market is in positive range, lower volatility is better since in this case the probability of
16 In a special case, Gendron and Genest (1990) find that the short-selling constraint produces a flat and negative
portfolio excess-return when the market is largely negative, and a positive and strongly increasing portfolio excess-
return for largely positive market excess-return.
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obtaining a negative return is reduced. But, if the market is too volatile the possibility of obtaining
a lower return is important. When the market is in slightly negative range, a higher volatility is
more likely to bring it into positive range. This is the main explanation why in this market situation
the conditional expected excess-return is higher in more volatile market. Finally, when the market
is in extremely negative range a higher volatility can lead to the violation of the VaR constraint,
that is why the conditional expected excess-return in this case is higher for less volatile market.
If we assume that μ = 0, the conditional expected portfolio return is symmetric as we have
proven in proposition 3. In this case, unlike the unrestricted framework where there is a shift of the
curve to the right when the market volatility increases and surpasses the volatility of the signal, we
will get that, a VaR restricted portfolio manager gets a lower conditional expected return in more
volatile market for almost all market excess-return value.
[INSERT Figure 3 HERE]
From the first chart of Figure 4, we can notice that the portfolio valuation increases with market
volatility. To put this result in line with the conditional expected excess-return it is worth noticing
that the "weight" used for overall valuation is larger around the mean where the curve with large
volatility is above the one with smaller volatility. For the portfolio valuation to have almost a flat
relationship with market volatility under the VaR regulation, the volatility should be much larger
for instance when σu > 0.3.
[INSERT Figure 4 HERE]
The comparison with the short-selling regulation stands like this. With conditional expected
excess-return as performance measure, market volatility reduces the manager performance in pos-
itive range but increases its performance in negative range, even though the conditional expected
excess-return will never be positive. Therefore in term of these measure VaR and short-selling
restriction have diﬀerent implications.
With performance valuation, one can see from the second chart of Figure 4 that manager under
short-selling restriction will outperform the one under VaR when the market is too volatile, for
instance, when σu > 0.12. In the third chart of figure 4, we can see that when σu > 0.2, the change
in the market volatility has no additional eﬀect on the relative value of the portfolio valuation of a
short-selling restricted manager compared to the unrestricted manager. It stands at its minimum
value around 53%. While this is not true for the relative portfolio valuation of a V aR regulated
manager. Its relative portfolio will decrease to almost 0% of the unrestricted manager portfolio
valuation.
As a by-product of our study, we can interpret this as an indication that V aR can actually
work at reducing risk in the manager portfolio in the sense that, caring about its performance, a
VaR restricted portfolio manager should avoid market with high volatility and this may have as a
result of reducing investment in high volatile project. In this sense we are more in line with Yiu
(2004) and Cuoco, He and Isaenko (2008) than with Basak and Shapiro (2001).
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3.2.4 Quality of Information on Performance
For a coherent information model the information quality should improve the performance of the
manager who possesses it. Here we check the eﬀect of the quality of private information on the
relation between portfolio expected excess-return and the market excess-return, and then we analyze
this eﬀect on the overall performance valuation.
Expected Excess-Return and Quality of Private Information. In any setup, the curvature
of the relation between expected portfolio excess-return and the market excess-return is robust to
the information quality. However, this eﬀect is diﬀerent depending on whether the manager is
restricted or not.
In order to analyze the eﬀect of the quality of private information on the performance of an
unconstrained portfolio manager, let us consider the expression of the portfolio expected excess-
return in this case,
E (Rp|Rm=rm) =
1
ρ
∙µ
μ
σ2u
¶
rm +
µ
1
σ2s
¶
r2m
¸
. (14)
The information quality aﬀects only the second term which defines the concavity of the curve.
There is a positive relation between the accuracy of the information
³
1
σ2s
´
and the expected excess-
return of the portfolio. Moreover, a well informed portfolio manager performs better and symmet-
rically around
h
−μ σ
2
s
2σ2u
i
in good and bad market condition.
[INSERT Figure 5 HERE]
When there is no constraint, the portfolio manager takes full advantage of his private information
especially in extreme market conditions. The information "premium" r
2
m
σ2sρ
comes from the ability
to use private information to take a long position in market upturn and a short position in market
downturn. As we can see in Figure 5, a VaR regulated manager can still take advantage of a higher
quality of information and ends up with a better conditional expected portfolio return. A short-
selling constrained manager however, can not take a full advantage of the quality of his information
when the market is in bad condition.
Valuation and Quality of Private Information. The negative relation between valuation and
the standard deviation σs characterizes a positive relationship between the quality of information
and the portfolio performance. In fact, the first chart of Figure 6 can equivalently be interpreted
as a positive relationship between the quality of information
¡
1/σ2s
¢
and valuation.
[INSERT Figure 6 HERE]
Also, the valuation loss due to the VaR regulation is larger than the loss due to the short-selling
regulation when the quality of information is very high (small σs). But for lower and intermediate
quality of information (large σs), the valuation loss due to the VaR constraint is lower. It follows
that manager with a great capacity of obtaining a higher quality of information such as sophisticated
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investors (big banks and financial institutions with a good forecasting department as well as risk
management department, hedge funds) will prefer the short-selling regulation to a VaR restriction.
More specifically, for a manager with a better quality of information (σs < 0.12), short-selling
regulation is better than the VaR regulation (see, chart 2 and chart 3 of Figures 6). This preference
changes when the quality of information is bad, i.e., σs > 0.12. Another important result is that
when the quality of information is too bad for instance for σs > 0.35, a VaR regulated manager has
almost the same portfolio valuation than an unregulated manager. In other words, if the market is
eﬃcient, the VaR restriction will have very little eﬀect on the portfolio manager performance. Again,
a manager with very accurate information finds the VaR regulation too harmful. Their valuation
relative to the unrestricted market is hampered heavily. For instance, for σs = 0.10, the ratio of
the VaR restricted manager portfolio valuation over an unrestricted manager portfolio valuation is
almost 40%, meaning that the VaR restriction reduces the portfolio manager performance by more
than half (60%)"
3.2.5 Risk-Aversion and Manager Performance
We analyze below the importance of the risk aversion eﬀect on conditional expected excess-return in
diﬀerent market conditions and we then use the valuation to assess the overall eﬀect of the attitude
toward risk of the portfolio manager on his performance.
Expected Excess-Return and Risk Aversion. Without any restriction, when a manager
possesses a private information, more he is risk averse, less he takes advantage of this information.
The same implication is valid under the VaR restriction. In fact, the more aggressive manager is able
to out-perform the less aggressive one in any market conditions; (see, Figure 7). Basak and Shapiro
(2001) argue that, as an agent becomes less risk averse, he responds more aggressively to change in
the state variable, this aﬀects his likelihood to end up violating the constraint. However, with an
accurate private information this apparent large level of risk taken is actually a wise and aggressive
way to take advantage of his information. When the manager faces a short-selling restriction his
aggressiveness is punished when the market return turns to be negative.
[INSERT Figure 7 HERE]
Although these results are not obvious from expression of the conditional expected portfolio
excess-return in the case of restricted manager, we can easily notice from equation (14) that in the
unrestricted framework, there is a negative relationship between the risk aversion coeﬃcient ρ and
the expected excess-return of the portfolio.
Gendron and Genest (1990) compute the expected excess-return of the portfolio manager under
the short-selling constraint. But they do not study its relation with risk aversion. The Figure 7
provides the typical relationship between risk aversion and expected excess-return.
Valuation and Risk Aversion. Following the results from the conditional expected portfolio
excess-return in the cases of unrestricted and VaR restricted manager, it is consistent to have
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an overall performance valuation which is a decreasing function of risk aversion. The short-selling
restriction which presents diﬀerent results depending on the market situation, finally follows overall
the same pattern as in the other framework, where the valuation decreases with the risk aversion
coeﬃcient.
[INSERT Figure 8 HERE]
When manager are too risk averse, the valuation loss due to the VaR regulation is lower than
the one due to the short-selling regulation. Also with very risk-averse manager, VaR regulation
ultimately has no incident on his valuation.
A less risk-averse manager enjoys a higher portfolio valuation (see Figure 8). For a less risk
averse manager (i.e. lower ρ), the short-selling regulation is better than the VaR. In fact, from
Figure 8, we can notice that when ρ is small (less than 7.5), the ratio of the restricted portfolio
valuation over the unrestricted portfolio valuation is higher in case of short-selling regulation than
in the case of the VaR regulation. The result is diﬀerent when ρ is higher.
Also, while for a very large ρ, the portfolio valuation of a VaR constraint manager is almost the
same as the one of an unregulated manager, a short-selling regulated manager will never achieve the
value of the overall portfolio valuation of an unrestricted manager whatever is its attitude toward
risk. From the third charts of Figure 8 we see that the maximum that a short-selling regulated
manager can achieve is about 53.5%, of the unrestricted manager portfolio. The VaR restriction
seems to strongly penalize an aggressive manager while a short-selling restriction moderately aﬀects
manager regardless his risk aversion level.
3.3 Robustness Check
The calibration exercise is carried out using plausible values of parameters. Here we check if the
variation of parameters will aﬀect the overall pattern of the curves. We specially analyze under
VaR restriction how the curve representing the relationship between portfolio return and market
return evolves inside a range of values for the VaR limit, the information quality, and the risk
version coeﬃcient. As it is shown in Figure 9, we can see that the U-shape of the relation is quite
stable when these parameters change.
[INSERT Figure 9 HERE]
This U-shape tends to vanish with stronger restricted VaR limit (upper graph in Figure 9),
poorer information quality (left lower graph in Figure 9), and more risk averse portfolio manager
(right lower graph in Figure 9).
We also analyze the robustness of the overall valuation ratio of VaR restricted manager over
the unrestricted manager (see Figure 10), by changing two parameters at the same time.
[INSERT Figure 10 HERE]
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Analyzing how the VaR restriction aﬀects the overall performance in relation with the informa-
tion level, we vary successively parameters representing the risk aversion, the limit of VaR, and the
market excess return. The conclusion that good quality information (lower σs ) is more aﬀected by
VaR constraint is quite consistent regardless the risk aversion (upper graph in Figure 10), the limit
of VaR (left lower graph in Figure 10), and the market excess return (right lower graph in Figure
10). When taking a cross-sectional look of these three dimension graphs, we see that all variations
are consistent with our two-dimension findings.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we use a framework of a portfolio manager with private information to characterize
and analyze the portfolio manager performances with the conditional expected portfolio excess-
return and portfolio valuation in the case of a VaR restricted manager. Furthermore, we compare
manager performances under VaR constraint with those under unrestricted market as well as under
short-selling regulated market.
We obtain with VaR constraint a less asymmetric curvature than the one obtained with the
short-selling constraint. We show that under VaR restricion, if the average excess-return is null,
the conditional expected portfolio excess-return is a symmetric function of the market excess return
as in the case of unrestricted market environment. This contrasts with the asymmetry curvature
of the conditional expected excess-return in the short-selling constraint case. However, in a more
realistic case where the average excess-return is positive, the curvature is asymmetry in a VaR
regulated market, although, unlike in the short-selling regulated market, it allows the manager to
enjoy positive expected conditional excess-return even during downturn market conditions since
the VaR restriction allows the manager to short sell the market portfolio, while the short selling
restriction does not.
Moreover, we found some interesting results about the importance of the market volatility,
the quality of information, and the attitude toward risk on the manager performances. Using
the conditional expected excess-return to analyze the manager performance, the eﬀect of market
volatility, information quality and risk aversion depends on the market conditions. However, the
overall portfolio valuation provides a way to assess the implications of these restrictions. When
the overall portfolio valuation is considered to assess the manager performance, we found that: i)
in more volatile market, compared to the short-selling regulation, the VaR regulation will have a
strong negative eﬀect on the manager performance; ii) the VaR constraint overall strongly aﬀects
a manager with good quality of information, while the short-selling restriction moderately aﬀects
manager performance regardless the quality of their information; iii) also a too aggressive manager
finds the VaR regulation more harmful. Their valuation relative to the unrestricted market is
strongly aﬀected. Therefore the VaR restriction may not be the more preferable type of regulation
for informed and aggressive institutions such as hedge-funds and investment banks. Analyzing and
comparing the welfare eﬀects of VaR and short-selling regulation is another challenging issue which
should be addressed in a future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof. of Proposition 1:
The objective function is concave, so the global optimum (without constraint eﬀect) is given by
bbθ=ms
ρσ2
If the above value is inside the constrained set, then it is the solution, if not the solution is on the
boundary (corner solution).
i) For
½
ms ≥ 0
msμ+Φ−1 (α)msσu + ρσ2V ≥ 0
, or
½
ms ≤ 0
msμ− Φ−1 (α)msσu + ρσ2V ≥ 0
, one can
observe that
ms
ρσ2
belongs to the interior of the constrained set therefore
bθ = bbθ = ms
ρσ2
ii) For
½
ms ≥ 0
msμ+Φ−1 (α)msσu + ρσ2V ≤ 0
, we have the corner solution
bθ= − V
μ+Φ−1 (α)σu
iii) For
½
ms ≤ 0
msμ− Φ−1 (α)msσu + ρσ2V ≤ 0
, we have the corner solution
bθ= − V
μ− Φ−1 (α)σu
.
We can then summarize the general solution as follows
bθ = ms
ρσ2
[1A1 + 1A2 ]−
V
μ+Φ−1 (α)σu
1A3 −
V
μ− Φ−1 (α)σu
1A4
where
A1 = {msμ+Φ−1(α)msσu + σ2ρV ≥ 0,ms ≥ 0},
A2 = {msμ− Φ−1(α)msσu + σ2ρV ≥ 0,ms ≤ 0},
A3 = {msμ+Φ−1(α)msσu + σ2ρV ≤ 0,ms ≥ 0},
A4 = {msμ− Φ−1(α)msσu + σ2ρV ≤ 0,ms ≤ 0}.
Q.E.D.
Proof. of Proposition 2:
We know that E(Rp|Rm=rm) = E(bθRm|Rm=rm), since Rp = bθRm.
It follows that
E(Rp|Rm=rm) = rmE(bθ|Rm=rm). (15)
In order to compute E(bθ|Rm=rm) one should express bθ as function of rm. Therefore, the first step of
this proof is to rewrite bθ
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Let us depart from the solution of proposition 1.
bθ = ms
ρσ2
[1A1 + 1A2 ]−
V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
1A3 −
V
μ− Φ−1(α)σu
1A4 (16)
Given that V ≥ 0 and Φ−1(α) ≤ 0, it is straightforward that we have thee diﬀerent expressions of bθ with
respect of the relevant interval:
(i) If μ ≥ −Φ−1(α)σu,
bθ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
−V
μ−Φ−1(α)σu if ms ≤
−σ2ρV
μ−Φ−1(α)σu
ms
ρσ2 if ms ≥
−σ2ρV
μ−Φ−1(α)σu
(17)
(ii) If Φ−1(α)σu ≤ μ ≤ −Φ−1(α)σu;
One can easily shows that (16) is equivalent to:
bθ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−V
μ−Φ−1(α)σu if ms ≤
−V ρσ2
μ−Φ−1(α)σu
ms
ρσ2 if
−V ρσ2
μ−Φ−1(α)σu ≤ ms ≤
−V ρσ2
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
−V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
if ms ≥ −V ρσ
2
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
(18)
(iii) When μ ≤ Φ−1(α)σu, one can easily shows that (16) is equivalent to:
bθ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ms
ρσ2 if ms ≤
−V ρσ2
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
−V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
if ms ≥ −V ρσ
2
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
(19)
Since ms = 1σ
³
μ
σ2u
+ sσ2s
´
, and s ∼ N(rm, σ2s) we can consider that
ms =
1
σ
µ
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
+
z
σs
¶
,
with z ∼ N(0, 1). This last expression will be used in the rest of this proof
The second step that we now carry is the actual computation of E(bθ|Rm=rm). We will do this in each
interval.
Let us start with the case when Φ−1(α)σu ≤ μ ≤ −Φ−1(α)σ . It follows that
bθ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−V
μ−Φ−1(α)σu if z ≤ −
V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu − σs
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
1
ρ
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
+ zρσs if −
V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu − σs
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
≤ z ≤ − V ρσsμ+Φ−1(α)σu − σs
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
−V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
if z ≥ − V ρσsμ+Φ−1(α)σu − σs
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
(20)
one can realize that bθ = g(z), therefore E(bθ|Rm=rm) = ∞Z
−∞
g(z)φ(z)dz, where φ(z) is the pdf of the
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normal distribution N(0, 1)
E(bθ) =
− V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?Z
−∞
−V
μ− Φ−1(α)σu
φ(z)dz
+
− V ρσs
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?Z
− V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸
+
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
+
∞Z
− V ρσs
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?
−V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
φ(z)dz
= E1 +E2 +E3
In the following derivation we will use the following notationsB1 = −σs
³
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
´
, B2 = −V(μ−Φ−1(α)σu) ,
B3 = B1 + ρσsB2, B4 = −V(μ+Φ−1(α)σu) , B5 = B1 + ρσsB4.
Let us develop each of these expressions,
E1 =
− V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?Z
−∞
−V
μ−Φ−1(α)σuφ(z)dz
=
B3Z
−∞
B2φ(z)dz
= B2Φ (B3)
E2 =
B5Z
B3
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸
+
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
=
B5Z
B3
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸¶
φ(z)dz +
B5Z
B3
µ
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
=
1
ρσs
B5Z
B3
zφ(z)dz +
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
ρ
B5Z
B3
φ(z)dz
Thus, E2 =
1
ρσs
B5Z
B3
zφ(z)dz − B5
ρσs
(Φ(B5)− Φ(B3))
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E3 =
∞Z
− V ρσs
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?
−V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
φ(z)dz
=
−V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
∞Z
B5
φ(z)dz
= B4
∞Z
B5
φ(z)dz
Thus, E3 = B4 (1− Φ(B5))
It follows that
E(bθ|Rm=rm) =
⎡
⎣B2Φ (B3) +B4 (1− Φ(B5))−
B1
ρσs
[Φ(B5)−Φ(B3)] +
1
ρσs
B5Z
B3
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎦
We now consider the case where μ ≥ −Φ−1(α)σu. In this case
bθ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
−V
μ−Φ−1(α)σu if z ≤ −
V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu − σs
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
1
ρ
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
+ zρσs if z ≥ −
V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu − σs
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i . (21)
Therefore
E(bθ) =
− V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?Z
−∞
−V
μ− Φ−1(α)σu
φ(z)dz
+
∞Z
− V ρσs
μ−Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸
+
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
= E1 + F1
As in the previous case let us develop each expression
From the previous case we know that E1 = B2Φ (B3) we will then compute only F1
F1 =
∞Z
B3
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸
+
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
=
∞Z
B3
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸¶
φ(z)dz +
B1Z
B3
µ
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
=
1
ρσs
∞Z
B3
zφ(z)dz +
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
ρ
∞Z
B3
φ(z)dz
Thus F1 =
1
ρσs
∞Z
B3
zφ(z)dz − B1
ρσs
(1−Φ(B3))
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Therefore,
E(bθ|Rm=rm) =
⎡
⎣B2Φ (B3)−
B1
ρσs
[1−Φ(B3)] +
1
ρσs
∞Z
B3
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎦
Finally in the case where μ ≤ Φ−1(α)σu
bθ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1
ρ
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
+ zρσs if z ≤ −
V ρσs
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
− σs
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i
−V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
if z ≥ − V ρσsμ+Φ−1(α)σu − σs
h
μ
σ2u
+ rmσ2s
i (22)
And it follows that
E(bθ|Rm=rm) =
− V ρσs
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?Z
−∞
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸
+
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
+
∞Z
− V ρσs
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?
−V
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
φ(z)dz
= F2 +E3
The value of E3 is already known and is given by E3 = B4 (1−Φ(B5)) we will then compute only F2
F2 =
− V ρσs
μ+Φ−1(α)σu
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
?Z
−∞
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸
+
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
=
B5Z
−∞
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸
+
z
ρσs
¶
φ(z)dz
=
B5Z
−∞
z
ρσs
φ(z)dz +
B5Z
−∞
µ
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸¶
φ(z)dz
=
1
ρσs
B5Z
−∞
zφ(z)dz +
1
ρ
∙
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
¸ B5Z
−∞
φ(z)dz
Thus F2 =
1
ρσs
B5Z
−∞
zφ(z)dz − B1
ρσs
(Φ(B5))
It then follows that
E(bθ|Rm=rm) =
⎡
⎣B4 (1− Φ(B5))−
B1Φ(B5)
ρσs
+
1
ρσs
B5Z
−∞
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎦
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By putting all three cases, the general expression of E(Rp|Rm=rm) ≡ rmE(bθ|Rm=rm) is exactly what we
have in the proposition 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof. of the Proposition 3
Let us first set a new notation E(Rp|Rm = rm) = ERp(rm). We want to show that if the average
market excess return is zero then the relation between the optimal portfolio expected return and the market
return is symmetric, i.e.,
μ = 0⇒ ∀rm ∈ IR+, ERp(−rm) = ERp(rm).
If μ = 0, we have Φ−1(α)σu ≤ μ ≤ −Φ−1(α)σu, therefore,
ERp(rm) = rm
⎡
⎣B2Φ (B3) +B4 (1− Φ(B5))−
B1
ρσs
[Φ(B5)− Φ(B3)] +
1
ρσs
B5Z
B3
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎦
and in this case B1 = rmσs , B2 =
V
Φ−1(α)σu
;B4 = −B2; B3 = rmσs + ρσsB2;B5 =
rm
σs − ρσsB2. Therefore
ERp(rm) can be rewritten as
ERp(rm) = rm
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
B2Φ
³
rm
σs + ρσsB2
´
−B2
h
1−Φ(rmσs − ρσsB2)
i
− rmρσ2s
h
Φ
³
rm
σs − ρσsB2
´
− Φ( rmσs + ρσsB2)
i
+ 1ρσs
rm
σs
−ρσsB2Z
rm
σs
+ρσsB2
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (23)
Let us now show that ERp(rm) = ERp(−rm).
From (23)
ERp(−rm) = −rm
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
B2Φ
³
−rm
σs + ρσsB2
´
−B2
³
1− Φ(−rmσs − ρσsB2)
´
+ rmρσ2s
h
Φ(−rmσs − ρσsB2)− Φ(
−rm
σs + ρσsB2)
i
+ 1ρσs
−rm
σs
−ρσsB2Z
−rm
σs
+ρσsB2
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Using the relationships Φ (−x) = 1− Φ (x) , φ(x) = φ(−x) for any x , we can set that
Φ
µ
−rm
σs
+ ρσsB2
¶
= 1− Φ
µ
rm
σs
− ρσsB2
¶
;
1− Φ(−rm
σs
− ρσsB2) = Φ(
rm
σs
+ ρσsB2); and
−rm
σs
−ρσsB2Z
−rm
σs
+ρσsB2
zφ(z)dz =
rm
σs
−ρσsB2Z
rm
σs
+ρσsB2
− yφ(y)dy.
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Then,
ERp(−rm) = −rm
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
B2
³
1− Φ
³
rm
σs − ρσsB2
´´
−B2
³
Φ( rmσs + ρσsB2)
´
+ rmρσ2s
h
Φ
³
rm
σs − ρσsB2
´
− Φ( rmσs + ρσsB2)
i
− 1ρσs
rm
σs
−ρσsB2Z
rm
σs
+ρσsB2
yφ(y)dy
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= −rm
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−B2Φ(rmσs + ρσsB2) +B2
³
1− Φ
³
rm
σs − ρσsB2
´´
+ rmρσ2s
h
Φ
³
rm
σs − ρσsB2
´
− Φ( rmσs + ρσsB2)
i
− 1ρσs
rm
σs
−ρσsB2Z
rm
σs
+ρσsB2
yφ(y)dy
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= rm
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
B2Φ(rmσs + ρσsB2)−B2
³
1− Φ
³
rm
σs − ρσsB2
´´
− rmρσ2s
h
Φ
³
rm
σs − ρσsB2
´
−Φ(rmσs + ρσsB2)
i
+ 1ρσs
rm
σs
−ρσsB2Z
rm
σs
+ρσsB2
yφ(y)dy
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= ERp(rm).
So ERp(−rm) = ERp(rm). or more precisely, E(−Rp|Rm = rm) = E(Rp|Rm = rm), and the
proposition 3 follows Q.E.D.
Proof. of Proposition 4:
The performance valuation is given by
V L = (1 + rf )−1
∞Z
−∞
E(Rp|rm)dF (rm), F (rm) ∼ N(0, σ2u), (24)
Since Φ−1(α)σu ≤ μ ≤ −Φ−1(α)σu, we know that
E(Rp|Rm=rm) = rm
⎡
⎣B2Φ (B3) +B4 (1− Φ(B5))− B1ρσs [Φ(B5)− Φ(B3)] +
1
ρσs
B5Z
B3
zφ(z)dz
⎤
⎦
It follows that
V L = (1 + rf )
−1
⎡
⎣
∞Z
−∞
rmB2 (Φ (B3)) dF (rm) +
∞Z
−∞
rmB4 [1− Φ (B5)] dF (rm)
−
∞Z
−∞
rm[Φ(B5)−Φ(B3)]B1
ρσs dF (rm) +
∞Z
−∞
rm
ρσs
B5Z
B3
zφ(z)dzdF (rm)
⎤
⎦
Let us consider the following notation
V L = (1 + rf )−1 [V1 + V2 − V3 + V4] . (25)
It is convenient to compute each of the Vi
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Computation of V1
V1 =
∞Z
−∞
rmB2 (Φ (B3)) dF (rm)
= B2
∞Z
−∞
rmB2 (Φ (B3))φσ2u(rm)drm
=
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
rm
∙
Φ
∙
−σs
µ
μ
σ2u
+
rm
σ2s
+
V ρ
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
¶¸¸
φσ2u(rm)drm
=
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
rm
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
?Z
−∞
φ(u)du
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
φσ2u(rm)drm
or
V1 =
−V
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
rm
⎡
⎣
∞Z
−∞
1
u≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ rm
σ2s
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??φ(u)du
⎤
⎦φσ2u(rm)drm
=
−V
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
rm
⎡
⎣
∞Z
−∞
1?
u+ rmσs
?
≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??φ(u)du
⎤
⎦φσ2u(rm)drm
i.e.
V1 =
−V
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
rm
⎡
⎣
∞Z
−∞
1?
u+ rmσs
?
≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??φ(u)du
⎤
⎦φσ2u(rm)drm (26)
In order to proceed we will consider the following linear transformation of variables
⎧
⎨
⎩
y = u+ rmσs
v = u
The Jacobian matrix of this transformation is equal to σs.
It follows that
V1 =
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
(σs (y − v))
⎡
⎣
∞Z
−∞
1
y≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??
⎤
⎦φσ2u(σs (y − v))φ(u)dudrm
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Besides,
φ(v)φσ2u(σs (y − v)) =
1√
2π
exp
∙
−1
2
v2
¸
1p
2πσ2u
exp
∙
− σ
2
s
2σ2u
(y − v)2
¸
=
1√
2π
1p
2πσ2u
exp
∙
−1
2
µµ
1 +
σ2s
σ2u
¶
v2 +
σ2s
σ2u
y2 − 2σ
2
s
σ2u
yv
¶¸
=
1r
2π
³
1 + σ
2
u
σ2s
´ exp
⎡
⎣− 1
2
³
1 + σ
2
u
σ2s
´y2
⎤
⎦
× 1r
2π
³
σ2uσ2s
σ2u+σ2s
´ exp
⎡
⎣− 1
2
³
σ2uσ2s
σ2u+σ2s
´ µσsµv − σ2sσ2u + σ2s y
¶¶2⎤
⎦
= φ?
1+
σ2u
σ2s
?(y)φ? σ2uσ2s
σ2u+σ
2
s
?
µ
σs
µ
v − σ
2
s
σ2u + σ2s
y
¶¶
= φ
A2
(y)φ
B2
(σs (v − Cy))
with φα2(x) means X ∼ N(0, α2), and where A2 =
µ
1 +
σ2u
σ2s
¶
;B2=
µ
σ2uσ2s
σ2u + σ2s
¶
;C =
σ2s
σ2u + σ2s
i.e.
φ(v)φσ2s(σs (y − v)) = φA2 (y)φB2 (σs (v − Cy)) (27)
It follows that
V1 =
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
¡
σ2s (y − v)
¢⎡⎣ ∞Z
−∞
1
y≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??
⎤
⎦φ
A2
(y)φ
B2
(σs (v − Cy)) dvdy
=
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
∞Z
−∞
1
y≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??σ2s (y − v)φA2 (y)φB2 (σs (v − Cy)) dvdy
=
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
∞Z
−∞
1
y≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??σ2s (y − v)φA2 (y)φB2 (σs (v − Cy)) dvdy
=
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
1
y≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??σ2sφ2(y)
⎡
⎣
∞Z
−∞
(y − v)φ
B2
(σs (v − Cy)) dv
⎤
⎦ dy
One can show that
∞Z
−∞
(y − v)φB2 (σs (v − Cy)) dv =
(1−C)y
σs
Actually, using the following transformation x = σs (v − Cy)
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The Jacobian of the distribution is given by dvdx =
1
σs , thus
∞Z
−∞
(y − v)φB2 (σs (v − Cy)) dv =
∞Z
−∞
µ
(1− C) y − x
σs
¶
φB2 (x)
1
σs
dx
=
1
σs
∞Z
−∞
µ
(1− C) y − x
σs
¶
φB2 (x) dx
=
1
σs
⎡
⎣
∞Z
−∞
((1− C) y)φB2 (x) dx+
∞Z
−∞
µ
− x
σs
¶
φB2 (x) dx
⎤
⎦
=
1
σs
∙
((1− C) y)− 1
σs
0
¸
=
(1− C) y
σs
Therefore,
V1 =
−V
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
∞Z
−∞
1
y≤
?
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
??σ2sφA2(y)
(1− C) y
σs
dy
V1 =
−V (1−C)σs
(μ− Φ−1(α)σu)
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
+ V ρ
(μ−Φ−1(α)σu)
?Z
−∞
yφA2(y)dy
V1 = (1− C)σsB2
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
−ρB2
?Z
−∞
yφA2(y)dy
Computation of V2
V2=
∞Z
−∞
rmB4 [1−Φ (B5)] dF (rm)
After replacing B1, B4, and B5 by their values, and using the same transformation as in V1 we obtain
V2 = B4σs(1−C)
∞Z
?
−σsρ
?
μ
σ2u
?
+σsρB4
?
yφA2(y)dy
Computation of V3
V3=
∞Z
−∞
rmB1[Φ(B5)−Φ(B3)]
ρσs dF (rm) =
∞Z
−∞
B5Z
B3
φ(u)du rmB1ρσs dF (rm)
After replacing B1, B3, and B5 by their values, and by using the same linear transformation as in V1,
we obtain
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V3=−1ρ
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
μ(1−C)σs
σ2u
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
?
+ρσsB4Z
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
?
+ρσsB2
yφA2(y)dy
+
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
?
+ρσsB4Z
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
?
+ρσsB2
h
(1− C)2y2 + B2σ2s
i
φA2(y)dy
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Computation of V4
V4=
∞Z
−∞
rm
ρσs
B5Z
B3
zφ(z)dzdF (rm)
After replacing B3, and B5 by their values,and follow the same steps as in V1 we obtain
V4 =
1
ρ
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
?
+ρσsB4Z
−σs
?
μ
σ2u
?
+ρσsB2
∙
C(1−C)y2 − B
2
σ2s
¸
φA2(y)dy
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
By putting all together, the general expression of V L ≡ (1+ rf )−1 [V1 + V2 − V3 + V4] is exactly what we
have in the proposition 4.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1 The relation between the portfolio expected excess return (Conditional Expected Portfolio Return) and the market excess-return 
(Market Return) under unrestricted, Short-Selling restriction and VaR restriction (parameters σs = 0.1; σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01; 
k1 = 0; k2 = 100; ⎯V = 0.518). 
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Figure 2. The upper graph represents the expected return in case of the VaR Restriction for three different levels of the VaR limit (with 
parameters σs = 0.1; σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01) The lower graph shows the ratio of the valuation of restricted portfolio manager over 
the valuation of unrestricted portfolio manager (with parameters σs = 0.1; σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01; k1 = 0; k2 = 100; ⎯V = 0.518). 
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Figure 3. The upper graph represents the expected portfolio excess-return in the case of unrestricted manager for two different level of 
market volatility (with parameters σs = 0.1; ρ=5; μ = 0.04). The left lower graph shows the expected return in the case of VaR restricted 
manager (with parameters σs =0.1; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01; ⎯V = 0.518). The right lower graph represents the expected return in the case 
of short-selling restricted manager (with parameters σs = 0.1; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; k1 = 0; k2 =100) 
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Figure 4. The upper graph represents the valuation in case of VaR Restriction in function of the market volatility (with parameters σs = 0.10; μ 
= 0.04; ⎯V = 0.518; α = 0.01; ρ = 5). The left lower graph shows the valuation of restricted portfolio manager (with parameters σs = 0.10; ρ = 
5; ⎯V=0.518; k1 = 0; k2 = 100; μ = 0.04; α=0.01). The right lower graph represents the ratio of the valuation of restricted portfolio manager 
over the valuation of unrestricted portfolio manager (with parameters σs = 0.10; ρ = 5; ⎯V = 0.518; k1 = 0; k2 = 100; μ = 0.04; α=0.01). 
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Figure 5. The upper graph represents the expected portfolio excess-return in the case of unrestricted manager for two different level of 
information accuracy (with parameters σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04). The left lower graph shows the expected return in the case of VaR restricted 
manager (with parameters σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01; ⎯V = 0.518). The right lower graph represents the expected return in the case of 
short-selling restricted manager (with parameters σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; k1=0; k2 = 100) 
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Figure 6. The upper graph represents the valuation in case of VaR Restriction in function of the information quality (with parameters σu = 
0.15; μ = 0.04; ⎯V = 0.518; α = 0.01; ρ = 5). The left lower graph shows the valuation of restricted portfolio manager (with parameters σu = 
0.15; ρ = 5; ⎯V = 0.518; k1 = 0; k2 = 100; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01). The right lower graph represents the ratio of the valuation of restricted portfolio 
manager over the valuation of unrestricted portfolio manager (with parameters σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; ⎯V = 0.518; k1 = 0; k2 = 100; μ = 0.04; α = 
0.01). 
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Figure 7. The upper graph represents the expected portfolio excess-return in the case of unrestricted manager for two different level of risk 
aversion (with parameters σu = 0.15; σs = 0.10; μ = 0.04). The left lower graph shows the expected return in the case of VaR restricted manager 
(with parameters σu = 0.15; σs = 0.10; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01; ⎯V = 0.518). The right lower graph represents the expected return in the case of short-
selling restricted manager (with parameters σu = 0.15; σs = 0.10; μ = 0.04; k1 = 0; k2 = 100) 
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Figure 8. The upper graph represents the valuation in case of VaR Restriction in function of the risk aversion (with parameters σu = 0.15; σs = 
0.10; μ = 0.04; ⎯V = 0.518; α = 0.01). The left lower graph shows the valuation of restricted portfolio manager (with parameters σu = 0.15; σs = 
0.10;⎯V = 0.518; k1 = 0; k2 = 100; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01). The right lower graph represents the ratio of the valuation of restricted portfolio manager 
over the valuation of unrestricted portfolio manager (with parameters σu = 0.15; σs = 0.10;⎯V = 0.518; k1 = 0; k2 = 100; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01). 
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Figure 9. The upper graph represents the expected return in case of the VaR Restriction as a function of both the market return and the VaR 
limit (with parameters σs = 0.1; σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01). The left lower graph shows the expected return in the case of VaR 
restricted manager Restriction as a function of both the market return and the information quality (with parameters σu = 0.15; ρ = 5; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01; ⎯V = 0.518). The right lower graph represents the expected return in the case of VaR restricted manager as a function of both the 
market return and the risk aversion (with parameters σu = 0.15; σs = 0.10; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01; ⎯V = 0.518). 
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Figure 10. The upper graph represents the valuation in case of VaR Restriction in function of both the information quality and the risk 
aversion (with parameters σu = 0.15; μ = 0.04; ⎯V = 0.518; α = 0.01). The left lower graph represents the valuation in case of VaR Restriction 
in function of both the information quality and the VaR Limit (with parameters σu = 0.15; μ = 0.04; α = 0.01; ρ = 5). The right lower graph 
represents the valuation in case of VaR Restriction in function of both the information quality and the average market excess return (with 
parameters σu = 0.15; ⎯V = 0.518; α = 0.01; ρ = 5). 
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